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Abstract—In this paper, we study the security of a compressed
sensing (CS) based cryptosystem called a sparse one-time sensing
(S-OTS) cryptosystem, which encrypts a plaintext with a sparse
measurement matrix. To construct the secret matrix and renew
it at each encryption, a bipolar keystream and a random permu-
tation pattern are employed as cryptographic primitives, which
can be obtained by a keystream generator of stream ciphers.
With a small number of nonzero elements in the measurement
matrix, the S-OTS cryptosystem achieves efficient CS encryption
in terms of memory and computational cost. In security analysis,
we show that the S-OTS cryptosystem can be indistinguishable
as long as each plaintext has constant energy, which formalizes
computational security against ciphertext only attacks (COA). In
addition, we consider a chosen plaintext attack (CPA) against
the S-OTS cryptosystem, which consists of two sequential stages,
keystream and key recovery attacks. Against keystream recovery
under CPA, we demonstrate that the S-OTS cryptosystem can
be secure with overwhelmingly high probability, as an adversary
needs to distinguish a prohibitively large number of candidate
keystreams. Finally, we conduct an information-theoretic analysis
to show that the S-OTS cryptosystem can be resistant against
key recovery under CPA by guaranteeing that the probability of
success is extremely low. In conclusion, the S-OTS cryptosystem
can be computationally secure against COA and the two-stage
CPA, while providing efficiency in CS encryption.
Index Terms—Compressed encryption, stream ciphers, indis-
tinguishability, plaintext attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
C
OMPRESSED sensing (CS) [1]−[4] allows to recover a
sparse signal from a much smaller number of measure-
ments than the signal dimension. A signal x ∈ RN is called
K-sparse with respect to an orthonormal sparsifying basis Ψ
if α = Ψx has at most K nonzero entries, where K ≪ N .
The sparse signal x is linearly measured by y = Φx + n =
ΦΨTα + n ∈ RM , where Φ is an M × N measurement
matrix with M ≪ N and n ∈ RM is the measurement noise.
In CS theory, if the sensing matrix A = ΦΨT obeys the
restricted isometry property (RIP) [3]−[5], a stable and robust
reconstruction of α can be guaranteed from the incomplete
measurement y. The CS reconstruction can be accomplished
by solving an l1-minimization problem with convex optimiza-
tion or greedy algorithms [2]. With efficient measurement and
stable reconstruction, the CS technique has been of interest in a
variety of research fields, e.g., communications [6]−[8], sensor
networks [9]−[11], image processing [12]−[15], radar [16],
etc.
The CS principle can be applied in a symmetric-key cryp-
tosystem for information security. The CS-based cryptosystem
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can simultaneously compress and encrypt a plaintext x through
a CS measurement process by keeping the measurement matrix
Φ secret. With the knowledge of Φ, the ciphertext y can then
be decrypted by a legitimate recipient through a CS recon-
struction process. The CS-based cryptosystem can be suitable
for security of real-world applications such as multimedia,
smart grid, and the Internet of Things (IoT) [17]−[23], where
plaintexts of interest can be modeled to be sparse in a proper
basis. Readers are referred to [24] for a comprehensive review
of CS in the field of information security.
Rachlin and Baron [25] proved that the CS-based cryptosys-
tem cannot be perfectly secure, but might be computationally
secure. In [26], Orsdemir et al. showed that it is computa-
tionally secure against a key search technique via an algebraic
approach. In [27]−[29], CS-based cryptosystems have been
studied in the framework of physical layer security [30] by
exploiting the randomness of wireless channels. To avoid
plaintext attacks, a CS-based cryptosystem can employ the
secret measurement matrix in a one-time sensing (OTS) man-
ner [31], where the matrix is renewed at each encryption. In a
CS-based cryptosystem using the OTS concept, a sender and a
legitimate recipient can use a secure random number generator
(SRNG) [32] to construct the secret matrices efficiently, by
sharing only the initial seed of SRNG as a secret key.
Using random Gaussian measurement matrices in the OTS
manner, Bianchi et al. [31] showed that the Gaussian-OTS (G-
OTS) cryptosystem can be perfectly secure, as long as each
plaintext has constant energy. In [33], the authors made a
similar security analysis for a CS-based cryptosystem which
employs circulant matrices for efficient CS processes. It has
also been studied for wireless security in [34], while a CS-
based cryptosystem with general partial unitary matrices em-
bedding a keystream has been investigated in [35]. In [36],
Cambareri et al. employed random Bernoulli matrices with
the OTS concept to encrypt plaintexts sparse with respect to a
non-identity orthonormal basis, which we call the Bernoulli-
OTS (B-OTS) cryptosystem in this paper. With the notion of
asymptotic spherical secrecy, they analyzed the security of the
B-OTS cryptosystem, asymptotically and non-asymptotically,
by modeling the ciphertexts to be Gaussian distributed. Then,
they quantitatively showed that the B-OTS cryptosystem and
its class dependent variations can be resistant against known
plaintext attacks in [37]. In [38], the security of the asymptot-
ically Gaussian-OTS (AG-OTS) cryptosystem, which employs
random Bernoulli matrices multiplied by a unitary matrix,
has been discussed in the presence of wireless channels. In
addition, the indistinguishability [39] of the G-OTS and the
B-OTS cryptosystems has been studied in [40], which turned
out to be highly sensitive to energy variation of plaintexts.
2Although the OTS concept is necessary for security against
plaintext attacks, it may cause complexity issues in practical
implementation. In processing large-size signals, renewing the
measurement matrix at each encryption would require massive
data storage and computing resources. To resolve this issue in
CS imaging field, a series of works have applied the technique
of parallel CS (PCS) [41] to CS-based cryptosystems in the
OTS manner, where the PCS framework can significantly
reduce the size of a measurement matrix at each encryption.
The CS-based cryptosystem proposed in [42] encrypts each
image column-by-column, renewing its measurement matrix
at each encryption with the counter mode of operation [39]
in block ciphers. In this scheme, however, the plaintexts with
unequal energy result in information leakage, which can be a
cryptographic weakness. To overcome this issue, each plain-
text should be normalized, which requires a secure auxiliary
channel to transfer the energy information to a recipient [43].
In [43], Hu et al. applied an additional cryptographic diffusion
process after each CS encryption of [42] in order to prevent
the information leakage.
In this paper, we propose the sparse-OTS (S-OTS) cryp-
tosystem, which employs sparse measurement matrices in the
OTS manner, to pursue efficiency and security simultaneously.
Since only a few entries of its measurement matrix take bipolar
values and all the others are zero, the S-OTS cryptosystem
can save the data storage and reduce the computational cost
required for encryption. To renew the secret matrix at each
encryption, we employ a linear feedback shift register (LFSR)
based keystream generator. In the S-OTS cryptosystem, we
show that a reliable CS decryption is theoretically guaranteed
for a legitimate recipient.
For security against ciphertext only attacks (COA), we
investigate the indistinguishability of the S-OTS cryptosystem.
If each plaintext has constant energy, we show that the S-
OTS cryptosystem can be indistinguishable, which formalizes
the notion of computational security against COA. Then, we
analyze security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA), which
can be more threatening. Against the S-OTS cryptosystem, this
paper considers a CPA of two sequential stages, keystream and
key recovery attacks. At the first stage, we verify that the S-
OTS cryptosystem can be secure against keystream recovery
under CPA with high probability, by showing that the number
of candidate keystreams is tremendously large. At the second
stage, conducting an information-theoretic analysis, we show
that the success probability of key recovery is extremely low.
To sum up, the S-OTS cryptosystem can be computationally
secure against COA and the two-stage CPA, while providing
efficient CS encryption by using sparse measurement matrices.
Implemented in parallel, the encryption process of the S-
OTS cryptosystem can also be fast. Although CS decryption
requires high complexity to solve an l1-minimization problem,
a legitimate recipient of potential applications, e.g., control
center in IoT systems, may have sufficiently high computing
power for CS decryption. Due to its fast and efficient encryp-
tion process, the S-OTS cryptosystem can be a good alternative
to conventional encryption schemes, e.g., AES [44], for delay-
sensitive lightweight devices.
This paper is organized as follows. First of all, Section II
presents the system model, reliability analysis, and complexity
benefits of the S-OTS cryptosystem. The indistinguishability
of the S-OTS cryptosystem against COA is investigated in
Section III. Section IV discusses adversary’s CPA strategies
and the corresponding security measures. Then, the security of
the S-OTS cryptosystem against CPA is analyzed in Section
V. Section VI numerically analyzes the security of the S-OTS
cryptosystem and demonstrates image encryption examples.
Finally, concluding remarks will be given in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Notations
ui,j , u
(i), uj , andU
T are the entry of a matrixU ∈ RM×N
in the i-th row and the j-th column, the i-th row vector, the j-
th column vector, and the transpose of U, respectively, where
1 ≤ i ≤ M and 1 ≤ j ≤ N . An identity matrix is denoted
by I, where its dimension is determined in the context. For a
vector x = (x1, · · · , xN )T , the lp-norm of x is denoted by
||x||p =
(∑N
k=1 |xk|p
) 1
p
for 1 ≤ p <∞. Also, ||x||0 denotes
the number of nonzero elements of x. If the context is clear,
||x|| denotes the l2-norm of x. For an index set Λ, |Λ| denotes
the number of elements in Λ. Finally, a vector n ∼ N (0, σ2I)
is a Gaussian random vector with mean 0 = (0, · · · , 0)T and
covariance σ2I.
B. Sparse One-Time Sensing (S-OTS) Cryptosystem
1) Mathematical Formulation: Let x ∈ RN be a K-sparse
plaintext with respect to an orthonormal sparsifying basis Ψ,
i.e., x = ΨTα with ||α||0 ≤ K . The S-OTS cryptosystem
employs a secret measurement matrix Φ = 1√
Mr
SP, where
S ∈ {−1, 0, 1}M×N is a sparse matrix containing q nonzero
elements in each row, P ∈ {0, 1}N×N is a matrix for permut-
ing the columns of S, and r = q
N
is the row-wise sparsity.
With Φ, the S-OTS cryptosystem encrypts the plaintext x to
provide the corresponding ciphertext
y =
1√
Mr
SPx+ n =
1√
Mr
SPΨTα+ n, (1)
where n ∼ N (0, σ2I) is the measurement noise. We assume
N
M
≤ q ≪ N2 for efficient encryption, where q is known to
an adversary. For convenient analysis, we assume that η = N
q
and Mr are integers throughout this paper.
2) Keystream Generation: To construct its secret matrix fast
and efficiently in the OTS manner, the S-OTS cryptosystem
may generate nonzero elements of S and a permutation pattern
P with SRNG. In this paper, we employ the self-shrinking
generator (SSG) [45] to continuously generate a secure pseu-
dorandom keystream fast and efficiently based on LFSR. The
initial state of LFSR, or the key, should be kept secret between
a sender and a legitimate recipient, while the structure of the
keystream generator can be publicly known. It is noteworthy
that LFSR-based keystream generators are more friendly to
fast hardware implementation than other keystream generators,
e.g., chaos-based keystream generators [46],[47].
Definition 1: [45] Assume that a k-stage LFSR generates
a binary m-sequence [48] of a = (a1, a2, · · · ), where ai ∈
3TABLE I
NOTATIONS AND VARIABLES
Notation Description
Φ M ×N secret measurement matrix
Ψ N ×N orthonormal sparsifying basis
S M ×N sparse matrix embedding secret bipolar keystream
P N ×N secret permutation matrix
Λi Index set of nonzero entries in the i-th row of S
k True key of length k
k̂ Estimated key of length k
bk True consecutive keystream of length k
b̂k Estimated consecutive keystream of length k
q Number of nonzero entries in each row of Φ, q ≪ N
2
r Row-wise sparsity of Φ, r = q
N
ρ, η, τ ρ = M
N
, η = N
q
, τ = ⌈k
q
⌉
{0, 1}. With a clock-controlled operation, the self-shrinking
generator outputs dt = a2i if a2i−1 = 1, and discards a2i
if a2i−1 = 0. Then, we obtain a bipolar keystream of b =
(b1, b2, · · · ), where bt = (−1)dt for t = 1, 2, · · · .
The SSG has a simple structure of a k-stage LFSR along
with a clock-controlled operator. Meier and Staffelbach [45]
showed that the SSG keystream is balanced, and has a period
of at least 2⌊
k
2
⌋ and a linear complexity of at least 2⌊
k
2
⌋−1.
With the nice pseudorandomness properties, we assume that
each keystream bit takes ±1 independently and uniformly at
random, which facilitates our security analysis of the S-OTS
cryptosystem by modeling the keystream bits to be truly ran-
dom Bernoulli distributed. In [49], numerical results demon-
strated the good statistical properties of the SSG keystream,
which supports our assumption. It is noteworthy that any other
LFSR-based keystream generators can be used to construct
each measurement matrix efficiently, as long as their keystream
bits can be modeled to be Bernoulli distributed.
3) Secret Matrix Construction: For given q and N , let
Λi = {((i − 1) mod η) · q + l | l = 1, · · · , q} (2)
be an index set of nonzero entries in the i-th row of S. Then,
cs = qM bits of the SSG keystream are embedded in S, where
si,j =
{
b⌊ i−1
η
⌋·N+j , if j ∈ Λi,
0, otherwise.
(3)
After the S-OTS cryptosystem constructs S, next cp bits of the
SSG output sequence can be used to generate a permutation
pattern P, where a number of algorithms that generate random
permutations from coin-tossing (0 and 1) have been studied
in [50] and [51]. To the best of our knowledge, cp ≈ N log2N
on average and the computational cost of its generation is
approximately N log2N [51]. To sum up, S and P can be
constructed from consecutive cs + cp ≈ qM +N log2N bits
of the SSG output sequence at each encryption.
A list of notations and variables, and a description of the S-
OTS cryptosystem can be found in Tables I and II, respectively.
C. Recovery Guarantee for CS Decryption
In CS decryption, reliability and stability must be guaran-
teed for a legitimate recipient of ciphertext y, who knows
TABLE II
THE S-OTS CRYPTOSYSTEM
Public
Structure of an LFSR-based keystream generator
Ψ, q, and Λi for i = 1, · · · ,M
Secret k, nonzero entries of S, and P
Keystream
generation
On input the key k, the keystream generator outputs a
keystream b.
Secret matrix
construction
On input cs+cp bits of the keystream b, the cryptosys-
tem constructs S and P, and then renews the keystream
bits at each CS encryption.
CS encryption
On input a plaintext x, the cryptosystem outputs the
ciphertext y = 1√
Mr
SPx, where S and P are renewed
at each encryption.
CS decryption
On input the key k and the ciphertext y, the plaintext
x = ΨTα is recovered by solving min ||α||1 s.t. y =
ΦΨTα+ n with the knowledge of Φ.
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Fig. 1. Phase transition diagrams of the B-OTS and the S-OTS cryptosystems,
where q = 32 and Ψ is the DCT basis.
the secret matrix Φ. In the S-OTS cryptosystem, the sensing
matrix A = 1√
Mr
SPΨT can be interpreted as a structurally-
subsampled unitary matrix [52], as Ψ is unitary, i.e., ΨΨT =
ΨTΨ = I. In the following, Theorem 1 gives a sufficient
condition forA to obey the RIP [3]−[5] with high probability,
which guarantees a reliable and stable CS decryption.
Theorem 1: [52] Let µΨ =
√
N maxi,j∈{1,··· ,N} |ψi,j | for
Ψ. With positive constants ca, cb, ε1 ∈ (0, 1), and δK ∈
(0, 1), the sensing matrix A = 1√
Mr
SPΨT of the S-OTS
cryptosystem satisfies the RIP of order K with probability
exceeding 1− 20max
{
exp
(
−cb δ
2
K
ε21
)
, N−1
}
, as long as
M ≥ caµ2ΨK log2K log3N · ε−21 . (4)
Remark 1: For a legitimate recipient, Theorem 1 shows that
the S-OTS cryptosystem can theoretically guarantee a stable
CS decryption with a proper choice of Ψ, i.e., µΨ = O(1).
Since the sufficient condition of (4) is irrelevant to q, changing
q to meet the security requirement does not affect the recovery
guarantee in CS decryption.
4Figure 1 illustrates the phase transition diagrams of the
B-OTS and the S-OTS cryptosystems in noiseless condition,
respectively, where Ψ is the discrete cosine transform (DCT)
basis and q = 32. Applying the orthogonal matching pursuit
(OMP) [53] for CS decryption, we tested 103 different plain-
texts at each test point, where the step sizes of M
N
and K
M
are
2−5 and 10−2, respectively. For each encryption, the plaintext
x = ΨTα is randomly generated, where nonzero entries
of α are Gaussian distributed and their positions are chosen
uniformly at random. In the region below each phase transition
curve, the corresponding CS-based cryptosystem successfully
decrypts ciphertexts with probability exceeding 99%, where a
decryption is declared as a success if the decrypted plaintext
x˜ achieves
||x−x˜||2
||x||2 < 10
−2. The figure shows that the CS de-
cryption performance of the S-OTS cryptosystem with q ≪ N
is similar to that of the B-OTS cryptosystem with q = N over a
wide range ofM , which implies that the theoretical guarantee
of the S-OTS cryptosystem is a bit pessimistic.
Using the S-OTS cryptosystem, we also encrypt an n×n 8-
bit gray-scale image in noiseless condition. For CS encryption,
all the columns of the image are stacked into a vector x ∈ RN ,
where N = n2. To examine the decryption performance
with the plaintext x, we employ SPGL1 [54] to obtain the
decrypted plaintext x˜ and then measure the peak signal-to-
reconstruction noise ratio (PSNR) averaged over 102 different
Φ, where PSNR = 10 · log10
(
N ·2552
||x−x˜||2
)
. To obtain α = Ψx,
2D versions of the DCT, the Daubechies 4 (D4) wavelet
transform, and the Haar wavelet transform bases are employed
as Ψ = Ψn ⊗Ψn, where Ψn ∈ Rn×n is an 1D sparsifying
basis and ⊗ is the Kronecker product. Using the test image
“Lena” with n = 256 and ρ = M
N
= 0.5, Table III shows the
average PSNR (APSNR) of a legitimate recipient in the S-OTS
cryptosystem for various q and Ψ. The S-OTS cryptosystem
guarantees a reliable CS decryption with the DCT basis having
µΨ = O(1). Also, we empirically found that CS decryption in
the S-OTS cryptosystem can be reliable with the D4 and the
Haar wavelet bases, which have much higher µΨ = O(
√
N).
As predicted by Remark 1, the decryption performance turns
out to be irrelevant to q.
D. Complexity Benefits
The B-OTS cryptosystem can be computationally more ef-
ficient than the G-OTS cryptosystem, since the bipolar entries
take less data storage and make matrix-vector multiplications
simpler. Nevertheless, the B-OTS cryptosystem requires MN
keystream bits and MN operations at each encryption, which
can be a burden to lightweight systems. By embedding fewer
nonzero entries in its measurement matrix, the S-OTS cryp-
tosystem can reduce the number of keystream bits and com-
putations. Moreover, it may have the benefit of fast encryption
by conducting the matrix-vector multiplication row-wise in
parallel. Table IV briefly compares the S-OTS and the B-OTS
cryptosystems in terms of reliability and complexity. Although
they have different M in theoretical recovery guarantees,
Table III and Figure 1 demonstrate that the S-OTS and the B-
OTS cryptosystems empirically guarantee similar decryption
performance with the same M . Furthermore, Section VI will
TABLE III
CS DECRYPTION PERFORMANCE OF 256 × 256 LENA IMAGE
(ρ = M/N = 0.5)
CS-based S-OTS B-OTScryptosystem
No. of nonzero 16 32 64 128 256 16384entries in a row (q)
DCT 29.8 29.7 29.8 29.6 29.7 29.7
D4 Wavelet 32.2 32.3 32.3 32.4 32.3 32.4
Haar Wavelet 30.5 30.5 30.7 30.6 30.7 30.6
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF S-OTS AND B-OTS CRYPTOSYSTEMS
CS-based cryptosystem S-OTS B-OTS
Measurements for
recovery guarantee Ω(µ
2
Ψ
K log2 K log3 N) O(K log N
K
)
Keystream bits
per encryption qM +N log2 N MN
Computational cost
per encryption qM +N log2 N MN
demonstrate that the S-OTS cryptosystem can be secure with
q ≪ N . Thus, the S-OTS cryptosystem enjoys a significant
benefit in complexity, compared to the B-OTS cryptosystem,
while guaranteeing its reliability and security.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS AGAINST COA
A. Security Measures
In ciphertext only attacks (COA), an adversary tries to figure
out a plaintext by only observing the corresponding ciphertext.
We consider the indistinguishability [39] to formalize the
notion of computational security against COA. In Table V,
the indistinguishability experiment [39] is described for a CS-
based cryptosystem in the presence of an eavesdropper. If no
adversary passes the experiment with probability significantly
better than that of random guess, the cryptosystem is said to
have the indistinguishability. In other words, if a cryptosystem
has the indistinguishability, an adversary is unable to learn any
partial information of the plaintext in polynomial time from a
given ciphertext.
In Table V, let dTV(p1, p2) be the total variation (TV)
distance [55] between probability distributions p1 = Pr(y|x1)
and p2 = Pr(y|x2). Then, it is readily checked from [56] that
the probability that an adversary can successfully distinguish
the plaintexts by a binary hypothesis test D is bounded by
pd ≤ 1
2
+
dTV(p1, p2)
2
, (5)
where dTV(p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, if dTV(p1, p2) is zero,
the probability of success is at most that of a random guess,
which leads to the indistinguishability [39].
Since computing dTV(p1, p2) directly is difficult [57], we
will employ an alternative distance metric to bound the TV
distance. In particular, the Hellinger distance [55], denoted by
dH(p1, p2), is useful by giving both upper and lower bounds
on the TV distance [58], i.e.,
d2H(p1, p2) ≤ dTV(p1, p2) ≤ dH(p1, p2)
√
2− d2H(p1, p2),
(6)
5TABLE V
INDISTINGUISHABILITY EXPERIMENT FOR A CS-BASED CRYPTOSYSTEM
Step 1: An adversary produces a pair of plaintexts x1 and x2 of the same length, and submits them to a CS-based cryptosystem.
Step 2: The CS-based cryptosystem encrypts a plaintext xh by randomly selecting h ∈ {1, 2}, and the corresponding ciphertext y = Φxh + n
is given to the adversary.
Step 3: Given the ciphertext y, the adversary carries out a polynomial time test D : y→ h′ ∈ {1, 2}, to figure out which plaintext was encrypted.
Decision: The adversary passes the experiment if h′ = h, or fails otherwise.
where dH(p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]. For formal definitions and proper-
ties of the distance metrics, see [55]−[57].
To analyze the security of the S-OTS cryptosystem against
COA, we examine the success probability of (5) as a security
measure.
B. Indistinguishability Analysis
In the indistinguishability experiment for the S-OTS cryp-
tosystem, we examine adversary’s success probability with the
TV distance dTV(p1, p2). In the following, Theorem 2 gives
upper and lower bounds on dTV(p1, p2).
Theorem 2: In the S-OTS cryptosystem, let p1 = Pr(y|x1)
and p2 = Pr(y|x2) in Table V. For a plaintext xh, let
θh =
xh
||xh|| and ch = N ||θh||44 for h = 1 and 2, respectively.
Assuming that xmin and xmax are the plaintexts of minimum
and maximum possible energies, respectively, γ = ||xmin||
2
||xmax||2 is
the minimum plaintext energy ratio and PNRmax =
||xmax||2
Mσ2
is the maximum plaintext-to-noise power ratio (PNR) of the
cryptosystem. Then, the worst-case lower and upper bounds
on dTV(p1, p2) are given by
dTV,low ≈ 1−
(
4γe
(γe + 1)2
)M
4
·
(
1− c
8q
(
γe − 1
γe + 1
)2)M
,
dTV,up ≈
√√√√1− ( 4γe
(γe + 1)2
)M
2
·
(
1− c
8q
(
γe − 1
γe + 1
)2)2M
,
respectively, where
c =
cmax
(1 + PNR−1max)2
·
((
γ
γe
)2
+ 1
)
, (7)
cmax = maxx1,x2(c1, c2), and γe =
1+γ·PNRmax
1+PNRmax
.
Proof : In the S-OTS cryptosystem, we can compute dH(p1, p2)
by replacing N by q in the proof of [40, Theorem 4], where
d2H(p1, p2) = 1−
(
4γe
(γe + 1)2
)M
4
(
1− c
8q
(
γe − 1
γe + 1
)2)M
.
Then, the lower and upper bounds on dTV(p1, p2) can be given
by dH(p1, p2) and (6), which completes the proof. ✷
Corollary 1: In the S-OTS cryptosystem, the success prob-
ability of an adversary in the indistinguishability experiment
is bounded by
pd ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√√√√1− ( 4γe
(γe + 1)2
)M
2
·
(
1− c
8q
(
γe − 1
γe + 1
)2)2M
.
(8)
In particular, if PNRmax =∞ and γe = γ,
pd ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√√√√1− ( 4γ
(γ + 1)2
)M
2
·
(
1− cmax
4q
(
γ − 1
γ + 1
)2)2M
.
Remark 2: In (7), ( γ
γe
)2+1 ≤ 2 for γ ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, we
need q ≥ cmax
4·(1+PNR−1max)2 to guarantee
c
8q ≤ 1 for all possible
γ, which makes the upper bound of (8) valid when PNRmax
is given. In addition, q ≥ cmax4 ensures that the bound is valid
for any PNRmax. As a result, the S-OTS cryptosystem can
be indistinguishable with any choice of q ≥ cmax4 , as long as
each plaintext has constant energy, i.e., γ = 1. Note that the
indistinguishability can be achieved asymptotically, due to the
Gaussian approximation [40, Remark 2].
Remark 3: The upper bound of pd in (8) converges to
1
2 as
γ goes to 1, where the convergence speed depends on cmax
q
for
given PNRmax. To achieve faster convergence, it is necessary
to have lower cmax
q
in the S-OTS cryptosystem. We can obtain
lower cmax if the energy of x is distributed as uniformly as
possible in each element [40]. When cmax is given, we need
to increase q to obtain a lower cmax
q
.
IV. CPA AGAINST THE S-OTS CRYPTOSYSTEM
A. Two-stage CPA
Chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) against the S-OTS cryp-
tosystem aim to retrieve the initial state of SSG, or the key k of
length k, from the pairs of a deliberately chosen plaintext and
the corresponding ciphertext. However, the SSG has a remark-
able resistance against known cryptanalytic attacks [59]−[63],
even if a consecutive SSG keystream is observed. Since an
adversary needs to make further efforts to reconstruct k after
restoring a consecutive SSG keystream, this paper considers a
CPA of two sequential stages against the S-OTS cryptosystem,
keystream and key recovery attacks.
To retrieve k at the second stage, an adversary may deploy
the key search algorithm in [63] requiring O(20.161k) con-
secutive SSG keystream bits, where the search complexity is
O(20.556k). However, the probability to successfully recover
such a long keystream at the first stage will be extremely low,
since the keystream can be placed across multiple encryptions
with different permutation patterns. Thus, we assume that an
adversary tries to observe a short keystream of length O(k)
at the first stage, and then employs the key search algorithms
in [60]−[62] at the second stage with the search complexity
of O(2λk), where λ ∈ (0, 1). To the best of our knowledge,
λmin ≈ 0.66 from [62], where λmin is the smallest λ among
the algorithms.
6To analyze the security of the S-OTS cryptosystem against
the two-stage CPA, we impose some mild assumptions without
loss of generality.
A1) The measurement noise is negligibly small, so noiseless
ciphertexts are available for an adversary.
A2) In cryptanalysis, an adversary with bounded computing
power cannot execute any detection algorithm with com-
plexity greater than 2L, where L > 0.
A3) The key length is sufficiently large, i.e., k > L, which
makes a brute-force key search infeasible.
A4) To deploy key search algorithms, it is sufficient for an
adversary to observe k consecutive keystream bits.
A5) In Φ, N ≥ k, which allows an adversary to recover k
consecutive keystream bits from a single measurement
matrix by guaranteeing qM ≥ N ≥ k.
Under the assumptions, Table VI describes the two-stage
CPA against the S-OTS cryptosystem, which exploits a single
plaintext-ciphertext pair. At the first stage (Step 3 of Table VI),
an adversary tries to recover a true keystream of length k, or
bk, which is hidden during encryption, by solving equations
with respect to the plaintext-ciphertext pair. The adversary then
attempts to deduce the true key k from the estimated keystream
b̂k at the second stage (Step 4 of Table VI).
B. Stage 1: Keystream Recovery Attacks
Since S has q consecutive keystream bits in each row, a true
consecutive SSG keystream bk can be obtained by recovering
τ = ⌈k
q
⌉ consecutive rows of S. Therefore, an adversary can
attempt to obtain an estimated keystream b̂k satisfying
yi =
N∑
j=1
φi,jxj (9)
for i = 1, · · · , τ . In the S-OTS cryptosystem, the permutation
pattern of P requires additional complexity for an adversary to
reconstruct bk from (9), by diffusing a consecutive keystream
across Φ. To obtain b̂k in the presence of P, the plaintexts of
an adversary’s choice can be classified into two classes.
− The first class includes plaintexts each of which enables
an adversary to bypass P by Px = x. Obviously, the
plaintexts of this class have the form of x = (a, · · · , a)T
with a nonzero constant a.
− The second class contains plaintexts each of which recov-
ers all the entries of Φ by a single CPA. In particular,
if x = (20, 21, · · · , 2N−1)T , all the entries of Φ can be
restored, while S and P are unknown.
We believe that bypassing P or recovering Φ, the two classes
may require lower complexity for keystream recovery under
CPA than any other selection of plaintext. Thus, we investigate
the security of the S-OTS cryptosystem by applying plaintexts
chosen from the above two classes. A security analysis em-
ploying a more efficient selection of plaintext is left open for
future research.
In the first class, if an adversary applies a plaintext x =
(a, · · · , a)T with a = √Mr, (9) becomes
yi =
∑
j∈Λi
si,j (10)
for i = 1, · · · , τ , where Λi is defined by (2) and si,j takes
±1 for j ∈ Λi. Let q+i = |Λ+i | and q−i = |Λ−i |, respectively,
where Λ+i = {j | si,j = +1, j ∈ Λi} and Λ−i = {j | si,j =
−1, j ∈ Λi}. Then, q+i = 12 (q + yi) and q−i = 12 (q − yi)
from (10), where the adversary obtains the numbers of +1’s
and −1’s in the i-th row of S.
With a plaintext x = (20, 21, · · · , 2N−1)T , all the entries
of a secret measurement matrix in the B-OTS cryptosystem
can be easily recovered by a single CPA [64]. Similarly, by
choosing the plaintext x in the second class, an adversary can
successfully restore all the entries of Φ = 1√
Mr
SP in the S-
OTS cryptosystem. If N ≥ k under A5), the adversary can
obtain q+i and q
−
i for i = 1, · · · , τ , from the entries of Φ, but
with no perfect knowledge of P.
Remark 4: From an attack with the second class plaintext,
an adversary can reduce the number of possible candidates of
P by observing the positions of nonzero entries of Φ, which
is not possible by an attack with the first class plaintext. Also,
if P is restored completely, the keystream bits embedded in S
can be directly obtained from Φ and P. However, we assume
that an adversary makes no attempt to recover P in the attack
with the second class plaintext, since retrieving P may still
require an extremely large number of computations, as shown
in an example attack of Appendix A. To analyze the effect of
P on the security of the S-OTS cryptosystem thoroughly, a
further research will be necessary.
In summary, this paper assumes that an adversary trying to
recover bk exploits the information of q+i and q
−
i for i =
1, · · · , τ , which can be obtained by applying either of the
two classes of plaintexts. Thus, we count the number of b̂k
satisfying (10) for i = 1, · · · , τ , as a security measure against
keystream recovery under CPA, which can be applicable to
the attacks with both classes of plaintexts.
C. Stage 2: Key Recovery Attacks
After estimating a consecutive SSG keystream b̂k, an ad-
versary tries to retrieve the key k of the S-OTS cryptosystem.
Once a true SSG keystream bk has been successfully recov-
ered, or b̂k = bk, the adversary is able to reconstruct k via
the key search algorithms in [60]−[62], as long as λmink ≤ L.
If λmink > L from a sufficiently long key, we assume that no
adversary is able to exploit such key search algorithms, even
when b̂k = bk. Then, we conduct an information-theoretic
analysis to develop an upper bound on the success probability
of key recovery Pkey = Pr[k̂ = k], which will be used as a
security measure against key recovery under CPA.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AGAINST CPA
A. Stage 1: Keystream Recovery Attacks
At the first stage of CPA, we assumed in Section IV.B that
an adversary attempts to obtain an estimated keystream b̂k
satisfying (10) for i = 1, · · · , τ , by exploiting the numbers of
+1’s and −1’s in each row of S. In what follows, Theorem 3
gives a lower bound on the number of possible b̂k.
Theorem 3: Let SCPA be the number of possible keystreams
of length k, when an adversary attempts to reconstruct a true
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TWO-STAGE CPA AGAINST THE S-OTS CRYPTOSYSTEM
Step 1: An adversary produces a plaintext x and submit it to the S-OTS cryptosystem.
Step 2: The S-OTS cryptosystem encrypts the plaintext x and gives the corresponding ciphertext y = Φx back to the adversary.
Step 3: At the first stage, the adversary attempts to recover a consecutive keystream bk by solving (9) from the plaintext-ciphertext pair (x,y),
which yields an estimated keystream b̂k .
Step 4: At the second stage, the adversary attempts to recover the key k using b̂k , which yields an estimated key k̂.
Decision: The adversary’s two-stage CPA succeeds if k̂ = k, or fails otherwise.
keystream bk with the knowledge of the numbers of +1’s and
−1’s in each row of S. Then,
SCPA ≥
(
q⌈
q−t
2
⌉)τ , SCPA,low (11)
with probability exceeding 1− ε2 for small ε2 ∈ (0, 1), where
τ = ⌈k
q
⌉ and t =
√
2q · log 2
1−(1−ε2)
1
τ
∈ [0, q].
Proof : See Appendix B.
In Theorem 3, if k and ε2 are fixed, SCPA,low is irrelevant
to N and only depends on q. Therefore, we can easily adjust
the lower bound of (11) by changing q. In the two-stage CPA,
if SCPA > 2L with a large q, the intractability of keystream
recovery at the first stage prohibits an adversary from finding
the true key at the second stage. In what follows, Theorem 4
gives a sufficient condition on q to guarantee SCPA > 2L with
high probability, which makes keystream recovery under CPA
infeasible.
Theorem 4: The S-OTS cryptosystem guarantees SCPA >
2L with probability exceeding 1− ε2, if k ≥ L · e log 2 and
q ≥ 1
2
(
2 +
4
β − 2
)2
log
2
1− (1− ε2) 1kρ+1
, qCPA, (12)
where ρ = M
N
, β = − k
L log 2W−1
(
−L log 2
k
)
, and W−1(·) is
the lower branch of Lambert W function [65].
Proof : See Appendix C.
Theorem 4 demonstrates that if each row of Φ takes more
nonzero entries than qCPA, keystream recovery under CPA is
theoretically infeasible with high probability. In what follows,
Corollary 2 gives the largest possible value of qCPA.
Corollary 2: In Theorem 4, if k ≥ L · e log 2, then β ≥ e,
which leads to
qCPA ≤ 1
2
(
2 +
4
e − 2
)2
log
2
1− (1− ε2) 1kρ+1
, qCPA,up.
(13)
Corollary 2 implies that if we choose q > qCPA,up, then
SCPA > 2L with high probability for every L ≤ ke log 2 . By
Theorem 4 and Corollary 2, the security parameter q should
be as large as possible to ensure that the S-OTS cryptosystem
can be secure against keystream recovery under CPA.
If the S-OTS cryptosystem has SCPA ≤ 2L, an adversary
may be able to obtain a true keystream bk. In Corollary 3, we
derive an upper bound on the probability that the adversary
successfully recovers bk with its computing power, where the
proof is straightforward from (18) and Appendix C.
Corollary 3: Let Psuc = Pr
[SCPA ≤ 2L] be the probability
that an adversary may succeed in keystream recovery under
CPA with the bounded computing power of 2L. If the S-OTS
cryptosystem satisfies k ≥ L · e log 2, we have
Psuc ≤ 1−
(
1− 2e− q2 (1− 2β )2
)τ
, Psuc,up,
where τ = ⌈k
q
⌉ and β = − k
L log 2W−1
(
−L log 2
k
)
.
Remark 5: As long as k ≥ L · e log 2, we have β ≥ e,
which implies that Psuc,up < τ · 2e−
q
2 (1− 2e )
2
in Corollary 3.
Note that the bound exponentially decays as q grows larger.
Thus, if k ≥ L · e log 2, the success probability of keystream
recovery under CPA disappears exponentially over q, and is
negligible [39], regardless of L. In summary, the S-OTS cryp-
tosystem is computationally secure against keystream recovery
under CPA in an asymptotic manner.
B. Stage 2: Key Recovery Attacks
At the second stage of CPA against the S-OTS cryptosystem,
an adversary attempts to recover the key k from an estimated
keystream b̂k, which is obtained at the first stage. If b̂k = bk,
the adversary can successfully reconstruct k via the key search
algorithms in [60]−[62] with the complexity of O(2λk), as
long as λmink ≤ L. With a long key satisfying λmink > L, no
known key search algorithms for SSG can succeed even when
b̂k = bk. Note that k ≥ L·e log 2 in Theorem 4 is sufficient to
achieve λk > L for all λ ≥ λmin = 0.66 in [62]. Alternatively,
we employ an information-theoretic tool to investigate the key
recovery performance for the S-OTS cryptosystem. Under the
condition that an adversary has obtained b̂k at the first stage,
we consider a hypothesis testing that the adversary chooses a
candidate key k̂ among 2δk hypotheses, where 1
k
≤ δ ≤ 1. In
what follows, Theorem 5 gives an upper bound of the success
probability of key recovery, or Pkey = Pr[k̂ = k].
Theorem 5: Based on b̂k, an adversary chooses a candidate
key k̂ among 2δk hypotheses, where 1
k
≤ δ ≤ 1. Let Pkey be
the probability that an adversary successfully recovers the key
of the S-OTS cryptosystem at the second stage of CPA. Then,
Pkey ≤ 2−k+
(
1− 2−k − δ + 1
k
)
·Psuc,up , Pkey,up, (14)
where Psuc,up is the upper bound on the success probability
of keystream recovery under CPA in Corollary 3.
Proof : See Appendix D.
Remark 6: In (14), Pkey,up only depends on Psuc,up when
k and δ are given. Therefore, reducing the success probability
of keystream recovery with a proper q can yield a low success
probability of key recovery, which leads to the security of the
S-OTS cryptosystem against the two-stage CPA.
8C. Key Refresh Time
When an adversary attempts the two-stage CPA repeatedly,
one can renew the key in every Tref encryptions to keep the S-
OTS cryptosystem secure, where Tref is the key refresh time.
In what follows, Theorem 6 provides a sufficient condition
on Tref to guarantee security against the two-stage CPA with
high probability.
Theorem 6: For small ε3 ∈ (0, 1), the S-OTS cryptosystem
guarantees security against the two-stage CPA within Tref
encryptions with probability exceeding 1− ε3, if
Tref ≤ log(1− ε3)
log(1− Pkey,up) , Tref,up, (15)
where Pkey,up is the upper bound on the success probability
of key recovery under CPA in Theorem 5.
Proof : Since the S-OTS cryptosystem renews its measurement
matrix at each CS encryption, the probability that the S-OTS
cryptosystem is secure against Tref repeated CPA is given by
(1− Pkey)Tref , which yields (15) immediately from (14). ✷
In the proof of Theorem 6, we assumed that an adversary
has no benefits by applying multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs
to the S-OTS cryptosystem, due to the usage of keystreams in
a one-time manner. However, this assumption does not take
into account the potential of a more elaborate strategy of an
adversary. More research efforts will be necessary to analyze
the security of the S-OTS cryptosystem against repeated CPA
with multiple ciphertext-plaintext pairs, which is left open.
As the SSG keystream has a period of at least 2⌊
k
2
⌋ [45],
note that (cs + cp) · Tref < 2⌊ k2 ⌋ must be satisfied to prevent
reuse of keystream bits, where cs and cp are the lengths of
SSG output sequences required to construct S and P in each
encryption, respectively.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents numerical results of the indistinguisha-
bility and the security against the two-stage CPA of the S-OTS
cryptosystem. Also, we demonstrate digital image encryption
examples.
A. Indistinguishability
Table VII shows the empirical values of cmax in Theorem 2
for various Ψ and N . Each cmax is measured over 10
6
plaintext pairs x = ΨTα, where α has Gaussian distributed
nonzero entries with K = 8. We can notice that the DCT and
the Walsh-Hadamard transform (WHT) bases, which have no
zero entries, yield low cmax with dense x. On the other hand,
the D4 and the Haar wavelet transform bases, which have
many zero entries, yield high cmax. According to Remarks 2
and 3, one needs cmax
q
≤ 4 for a valid upper bound of pd,
which should be as low as possible for fast convergence of
the bound. Therefore, the S-OTS cryptosystem may require a
large q when we employ a basisΨ with high cmax, like the D4
and the Haar wavelet bases, which compromises its efficiency.
Figure 2 depicts the upper bounds of the success probability
of an adversary in the indistinguishability experiment over γ
for the S-OTS and the G-OTS cryptosystems, respectively,
where N = 1024, M = 256, and PNRmax = ∞. Even
TABLE VII
EMPIRICAL cmax WITH DIFFERENT SPARSIFYING BASIS AND N
N 64 128 256 512 1024
DCT 5.6 4.8 4.5 4.2 4.0
WHT 5.0 4.6 4.4 4.1 4.0
D4 Wavelet 50.0 89.4 186.8 357.5 684.8
Haar Wavelet 49.7 82.5 163.9 319.8 555.4
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
γ
Ad
ve
rs
ar
y’s
 s
uc
ce
ss
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 u
pp
er
 b
ou
nd
s
 
 
G−OTS
S−OTS, c
max
 = 4, q = 8
S−OTS, c
max
 = 4, q = 256
S−OTS, c
max
 = 684.4, q = 256
S−OTS, c
max
 = 684.4, q = 512
Fig. 2. Upper bounds of pd over γ in the noiseless S-OTS and G-OTS
cryptosystems with various q and cmax, where N = 1024, M = 256,
cmax = 4 for the DCT or the WHT basis, and cmax = 684.4 for the D4
wavelet transform basis.
though the upper bound of (8) cannot be smaller than that
of the G-OTS cryptosystem presented in [40, Corollary 1],
the figure implies that we can make them closer to each other
with lower cmax
q
. If cmax = 4 for the DCT or the WHT basis,
numerical results revealed that the difference of the upper
bounds between the S-OTS and the G-OTS cryptosystems is
less than 10−2 for q ≥ 48. If cmax = 684.4 for the D4 wavelet
transform basis, it is necessary to have q ≥ 172 to make the
upper bound valid. In this case, the figure demonstrates that
the S-OTS cryptosystem with such a high cmax cannot make
the upper bound close to that of the G-OTS cryptosystem even
with q = N2 .
B. Security Against CPA
Figure 3 sketches log2 SCPA,low of Theorem 3 over q for
k = 128 and 256, where ε2 = 10
−5. The figure shows that
SCPA,low does not monotonically increase over q, but drops
whenever τ = ⌈k
q
⌉ changes its value. Thus, one needs to
choose q carefully, to avoid such drops and get a higher
SCPA,low. Moreover, if a selection of q yields log2 SCPA,low >
k, the keystream recovery attack can be computationally more
expensive than a brute-force key search. For example, if
k = 256 and q ∈ {108, · · · , 127, 151, · · · , 255, 279, · · · },
SCPA > 2k with probability exceeding 1 − 10−5. With such
q, a brute-force key search would be a better strategy, which
demonstrates the security of the S-OTS cryptosystem against
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Fig. 3. log2 SCPA,low over q for k = 128 and 256, where ε2 = 10
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Fig. 4. log2 qCPA and log2 qCPA,up over ε2 with various L, where k = 256
and ρ = 0.5.
keystream recovery under CPA.
Figure 4 depicts log2 qCPA of Theorem 4 over ε2 for
ρ = 0.5, k = 256, and L ≤ 128, where k ≥ L · e log 2 is
met. The figure shows that if q ≥ 137, then SCPA > 2128 with
probability exceeding 1−10−5, which suggests that the S-OTS
cryptosystem with such q can be secure against keystream re-
covery under CPA from an adversary with computing power of
at most 2128. In addition, qCPA,up < 512 at ε2 = 10
−5, which
implies that q ≥ 512 ensures SCPA > 2L, or the infeasibility
of keystream recovery under CPA, for any L < k
e log 2 with
probability exceeding 1− 10−5.
Figure 5 sketches Psuc,up of Corollary 3 and Pkey,up of
Theorem 5 over log2 q to demonstrate the security of the S-
OTS cryptosystem against the two-stage CPA, where δ = 0.5.
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Fig. 6. Tref,up over log2 q with various ε3, where δ = 0.5.
When k = 256 and L ≤ 128, the figure shows that q ≥ 128
guarantees Psuc < 10
−6. In addition, Figure 6 depicts the key
refresh time Tref over log2 q with δ = 0.5. When q = 256 and
ε3 = 10
−5, we have Tref > 108, which implies that the S-OTS
cryptosystem can be secure against the two-stage CPA using
the same key for 108 encryptions by keeping Pkey < 10
−5.
To sum up, Figures 3-6 show that if k = 256, L ≤ 128,
and ρ = 0.5, the S-OTS cryptosystem with q ≥ 512 has
sufficient resistance against the two-stage CPA with probability
exceeding 1 − 10−5, regardless of N . Recall from Remark 2
that the S-OTS cryptosystem must satisfy q ≥ cmax4 for the
indistinguishability, where cmax can be given with respect to
Ψ and N . In the end, we need to carefully choose q by taking
into account both the constraints for indistinguishability and
CPA security.
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C. Digital Image Encryption
Recall the simulation setup for digital image encryption in
Section II.C. With 256×256 images “Lena”, “Boat”, “Plane”,
“Peppers”, and “Barbara”, we encrypt each image, and then
decrypt it with SPGL1 [54] in noiseless condition, where 2D
version of the D4 wavelet transform basis is employed as
Ψ. We select q = 512, which meets the requirements for
indistinguishability and CPA security. Figure 7 visualizes the
original, encrypted, and decrypted images, respectively, where
ρ = 0.5. The encrypted images are visually unrecognizable
and then successfully decrypted with the knowledge of Φ,
where PSNR values are 32.2 dB, 29.6 dB 31.1 dB, 31.6 dB,
and 29.5 dB, respectively. In the examples of Figure 7, the
measurement matrix Φ is highly sparse with the row-wise
sparsity r = q
N
= 2−7 ≈ 0.78%. Using the sparse matrix
Φ, the S-OTS cryptosystem requires cs + cp ≈ 224 bits of
the SSG output sequence for each encryption process, while
the B-OTS cryptosystem uses MN = 231 bits. This implies
that the S-OTS cryptosystem can save a significant amount
of keystream bits while guaranteeing security against the two-
stage CPA.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the S-OTS cryptosystem, which
employs sparse measurement matrices for secure and efficient
CS encryption. With a small number of nonzero elements in
the measurement matrix, the S-OTS cryptosystem has com-
plexity benefits in terms of memory and computing resources.
In addition, the S-OTS cryptosystem can present theoretically
guaranteed CS recovery performance for a legitimate recipient.
In the presence of an adversary, we analyzed the security of
the S-OTS cryptosystem against COA and CPA. Against COA,
we exhibited that the S-OTS cryptosystem can asymptotically
achieve the indistinguishability, as long as each plaintext has
constant energy. To investigate its security against CPA, we
consider an adversary’s strategy that consists of two sequential
stages, keystream and key recovery attacks. We then showed
that the keystream recovery can be infeasible with overwhelm-
ingly high probability. Also, we conducted an information-
theoretic analysis to demonstrate that the success probability
of following key recovery can be extremely low with a proper
selection of parameters. Through numerical results, we demon-
strated that the S-OTS cryptosystem guarantees its reliability
and security, while providing computational efficiency.
APPENDIX
A. Example of Permutation Recovery Attack
In Section IV.B, a keystream recovery attack with the
second class plaintext can provide an adversary with the
positions of nonzero entries in Φ, which can be exploited
to recover P. Let ΛΦi be an index set of nonzero entries
in the i-th row of Φ. Given ΛΦi for i = 1, · · · ,M , an
adversary may attempt a known plaintext attack against the
permutation-only cipher [66] to find a true P, where a plain-
text pi = (pi,1, · · · , pi,N) and the corresponding ciphertext
ci = (ci,1, · · · , ci,N ) with respect to Λi and ΛΦi are given by
pi,j =
{
1, if j ∈ Λi,
0, otherwise,
and ci,j =
{
1, if j ∈ ΛΦi ,
0, otherwise.
Let C ∈ {0, 1}M×N be a matrix having ci as its i-th row for
i = 1, · · · ,M and c¯ ∈ RN be a composite representation [66]
of C, where the j-th element of c¯ is given by
c¯j =
M∑
i=1
ci,j · 2i−1.
According to [66, Proposition 2], the permutation pattern can
be uniquely determined if and only if all the entries of c¯ are
distinct. In the S-OTS cryptosystem, however, c¯ consists of
η = N
q
distinct integers {z1, · · · , zη}, where zi appears q times
in c¯ for all i = 1, · · · , η, due to the structure of S defined in (2)
and (3). Then, the number of possible permutation patterns is
SP = (q!)η,
which is smaller than N !, but still extremely large even for
small q andN . Although we can reduce the number of possible
permutations by observing the nonzero entries of Φ, retrieving
P can be intractable to an adversary with bounded computing
power. Note that this example does not take into account the
potential of a more elaborate attack exploiting the respective
positions of +1’s and −1’s in Φ, which is left open for future
research.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
Without loss of generality, let Γ = {1, · · · , τ} be a set of
the indices of the first τ rows in S. Then, an adversary can
obtain b̂k by estimating the i-th row of S, or s(i), for every
i ∈ Γ. Given q+i = 12 (q + yi) and q−i = 12 (q − yi) from (10),
the number of possible solutions for s(i) is given by
Si =
(
q
q+i
)
=
(
q
q−i
)
. (16)
Assuming that each nonzero entry of S takes ±1 indepen-
dently with probability 0.5, the sum of q independent random
variables yields yi = q
+
i −q−i = 2q+i −q ∈ {−q, · · · , q}, which
can be considered as a binomial random variable. Therefore,
the Hoeffding’s inequality [67] yields
Pr [|yi| < t] = Pr
[
q − t
2
< q+i <
q + t
2
]
≥ 1−2e−t
2
2q . (17)
Since q+i takes an integer value,
Pr
[
q − t
2
< q+i <
q + t
2
]
= Pr
[⌈
q − t
2
⌉
≤ q+i ≤
⌊
q + t
2
⌋]
.
From (16) and (17), Si can be bounded by
Si =
(
q
q+i
)
≥
(
q⌈
q−t
2
⌉),
with probability exceeding 1−2e−t
2
2q . Finally, the number of all
possible solutions for τ consecutive rows is SCPA =
∏
i∈Γ Si,
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(a) Original Lena (b) Original Boat (c) Original Plane (d) Original Peppers (e) Original Barbara
(f) Encrypted Lena (g) Encrypted Boat (h) Encrypted Plane (i) Encrypted Peppers (j) Encrypted Barbara
(k) Decrypted Lena (l) Decrypted Boat (m) Decrypted Plane (n) Decrypted Peppers (o) Decrypted Barbara
Fig. 7. Original, encrypted, and decrypted images of “Lena”, “Boat”, “Plane”, “Peppers”, and “Barbara”, respectively, where N = 65536, q = 512, k = 256,
ρ = 0.5 and Ψ is 2D version of the D4 wavelet transform basis.
where
Pr
[
SCPA ≥
(
q⌈
q−t
2
⌉)τ] ≥∏
i∈Γ
Pr
[
Si ≥
(
q⌈
q−t
2
⌉)]
≥
(
1− 2e−t
2
2q
)τ
.
(18)
Letting
(
1− 2e−t
2
2q
)τ
= 1 − ε2, t =
√
2q · log 2
1−(1−ε2)
1
τ
,
which completes the proof. ✷
C. Proof of Theorem 4
In (11), let ⌈ q−t2 ⌉ = α. Then, τ = ⌈kq ⌉ ≥ kq yields
SCPA ≥
(
q
α
)τ
≥
(
q
α
) k
q
>
( q
α
)α· k
q
.
Therefore, SCPA > 2L if q satisfies ( qα )α·
k
q ≥ 2L, which is
equivalent to
α
q
log
α
q
≤ −L log 2
k
. (19)
Since 1
x
log 1
x
≥ − 1
e
for x > 0, (19) is valid as long as
k ≥ L · e log 2. (20)
By taking W−1(·), (19) yields q ≤ αβ, where α = ⌈ q−t2 ⌉,
t =
√
2q · log 2
1−(1−ε2)
1
τ
, and β = − k
L log 2W−1
(
−L log 2
k
)
.
From q ≤ αβ, we have
q ≥ 1
2
(
2 +
4
β − 2
)2
log
2
1− (1 − ε2) 1τ
, (21)
which is a sufficient condition for SCPA > 2L. Furthermore,
since τ = ⌈k
q
⌉ < kM
N
+1 from N
M
≤ q, we have 1−(1−ε2) 1τ >
1 − (1 − ε2) 1kρ+1 , where ρ = MN and the sufficient condition
of (21) becomes (12), which completes the proof. ✷
D. Proof of Theorem 5
Based on b̂k, an adversary attempts to recover the true
key k by choosing a candidate key k̂. Let Perr be the error
probability of key recovery, where
Perr = Pr
[
k̂ 6= k|b̂k = bk
]
· Pr
[
b̂k = bk
]
+ Pr
[
k̂ 6= k|b̂k 6= bk
]
· Pr
[
b̂k 6= bk
]
.
(22)
When b̂k = bk, the data processing and the Fano’s inequali-
ties [68] yield
H
(
k|bk) ≤ H (k|k̂) ≤ Hb(pe) + pe · log2 |K| , (23)
where H(·) is the entropy of a random vector, pe = Pr[k̂ 6=
k|b̂k = bk], Hb(pe) = −pe log2 pe−(1−pe) log2(1−pe), and
K is a set of all possible candidates of k, i.e., |K| = 2k. Given
bk, assume that 2δk candidates of k are uniformly distributed,
i.e., H
(
k|bk) = δk. Using Hb(pe) ≤ 1, (23) yields
pe = Pr
[
k̂ 6= k|b̂k = bk
]
≥ δ − 1
k
. (24)
When the adversary has a wrong keystream, i.e., b̂k 6= bk, we
assume that the success probability of key recovery becomes
Pr
[
k̂ = k|b̂k 6= bk
]
= 2−k. (25)
With (24), (25), and Psuc = Pr[b̂
k = bk], (22) yields
Perr ≥
(
δ − 1
k
)
· Psuc + (1− 2−k) · (1− Psuc)
≥ 1− 2−k −
(
1− 2−k − δ + 1
k
)
· Psuc,up,
which completes the proof by Pkey = 1− Perr. ✷
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